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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the validity under the Import-Export
Clause of a nondiscriminatory state or local tax
based on the value of sales or personal property that
applies to goods in the stream of export should be
evaluated under this Court’s approach in Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), or in
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,
329 U.S. 69 (1946).

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4
I. RICHFIELD OIL IS A DOCTRINAL
ANACHRONISM ............................................. 4
II. FAILURE TO ADDRESS RICHFIELD
OIL’S STATUS CREATES UNCERTAINTY FOR MARKET ACTORS AND
FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ........................................................... 10
III. RICHFIELD OIL SHOULD BE OVERRULED.............................................................. 13
A. Richfield Oil Does Not Supply Lower
Courts with an Administrable Test ......... 13
B. Richfield Oil Is Inefficient, Inequitable, and Unnecessarily Intrusive upon
State Fiscal Autonomy ............................. 16
C. Reliance Interests Do Not Weigh in
Favor of Retaining Richfield Oil .............. 19
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 22
APPENDIX ............................................................... 1a

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES
Ammex, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 603
N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) ...................... 11
Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Robinson’s Hardware, 721 P.2d 137 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).......11, 14
Auto Cargo, Inc. v. Miami Dade Cnty., 237 F.3d
1289 (11th Cir. 2001) ........................................... 10
Bradford Exch. A.G. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 508 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ............. 11
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419
(1827) ..................................................................... 5
City of Los Angeles v. Marine Wholesale/
Warehouse Co., 15 Cal. App. 4th 1834 (1993) ...... 12
Coast Pac. Trading, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of
Revenue, 719 P.2d 541 (Wash. 1986) .................. 11
Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) ............. 2, 6
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977) .....................................................2, 6, 21
David Hazan, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal,
543 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App. Div. 1989), aff ’d,
556 N.E.2d 1113 (N.Y. 1990)............................... 11
Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734 (1978) .......................................2, 7, 8,
11, 19, 20, 21
Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun,
803 S.E.2d 54 (Va. 2017), pet. for cert. pending, No. 17-904 (U.S. filed Dec. 19, 2017) ......11, 17
Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Virginia Indonesia Co., 518 U.S. 1004 (1996) .......................... 13

iv
Holt Hauling & Warehousing Sys., Inc. v.
Director, Div. of Taxation, 9 N.J. Tax 446
(1987) ................................................................... 11
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652
(1945) ..................................................................... 6
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Cardwell, 814
S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1991), aff ’d sub nom. Itel
Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507
U.S. 60 (1993) ........................................... 10-11, 20
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston,
507 U.S. 60 (1993) ............................. 2-3, 7, 8-9, 20
Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 337 U.S. 286
(1949) ................................................................... 15
Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S.
62 (1974) .........................................................13, 16
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) ..................................... 20
Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353
(1984) ..............................................................10, 20
Lipshutz Bros., Inc. v. Tax Review Bd., 4 Phila.
374, 1980 WL 194215 (C.P. Pa. 1980), aff ’d,
439 A.2d 862 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) ................. 12
Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Pilot
Petroleum Corp., 900 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1990) ....... 11
Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871) ........... 2, 5
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1413 (1992)....12, 15
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976) .................................................2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 18, 20, 21

v
National Film Labs. v. California State Bd. of
Equalization, No. D049006, 2007 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 8088 (Oct. 4, 2007) ..................... 12
P.J. Lumber Co. v. City of Prichard, No. 2160627,
2017 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 185 (Civ. App.
Sept. 22, 2017) ..................................................... 11
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946) ................................ passim
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) ...................... 10
State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp Am.,
Inc., 674 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1983) ........................ 10
U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton:
631 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 2005), cert. denied,
547 U.S. 1179 (2006) ......................................11, 21
547 U.S. 1179 (2006) ........................................... 13
United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843
(1996) ............................................................4, 9, 21
Virginia Indonesia Co. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal
Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1995) ..........2, 6, 11, 15

CONSTITUTION AND RULES
U.S. Const.:
Art. I:
§ 8, cl. 1 (Taxing and Spending Clause) .......... 9
§ 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) ...............2, 4, 6, 21
§ 9, cl. 5 (Export Clause) .........................4, 9, 19
§ 10, cl. 2 (Import-Export Clause) .......... passim

vi
Sup. Ct. R.:
Rule 37.2(a) ............................................................ 1
Rule 37.6 ................................................................ 1

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade
in Goods and Services (FT900) (Jan. 5, 2018),
available at https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/Press-Release/current_press_release/
index.html .............................................................. 1
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Int’l Trade Admin.,
2016 NAICS Total All Merchandise Exports
to World, available at http://tse.export.gov/
tse/MapDisplay.aspx (last visited Jan. 23,
2018)..................................................................... 12

OTHER MATERIALS
Br. of Resp., Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, No. 91-321 (U.S. filed June 25,
1992), 1992 WL 511845 ......................................... 8
Pet. for Cert., Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v.
Virginia Indonesia Co., No. 95-1528 (U.S.
filed Mar. 20, 1996), 1996 WL 33439089 ............ 13
Pet. for Cert., U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton,
No. 05-1268 (U.S. filed Mar. 31, 2006), 2006
WL 869888 ........................................................... 13

vii
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22
(1992) ................................................................... 16
World Trade Org., Report of the Appellate Body:
United States—Conditional Tax Incentives
for Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS487/AB/R
(Sept. 4, 2017), available at https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/487abr_e.
pdf ........................................................................ 19

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are professors of tax law at universities
across the United States. As scholars and teachers,
they have considered the doctrinal roots and practical consequences of judicial limits on state and local
taxation. Amici join this brief solely on their own
behalf and not as representatives of their universities. A full list of amici appears in the Appendix to
this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For more than seven decades, state and local
governments as well as market actors have labored
under an export tax regime that is inconsistent, inefficient, and inequitable. This case presents the Court
with a chance to restore rationality to the tax treatment of the export sector. The economic implications
are vast: annual exports of goods from the United
States exceed $1.4 trillion.2 The Court’s resolution of
this case will determine whether state and local governments can apply their sales and personal property
taxes to exports in a balanced and nondiscriminatory
fashion.

1

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amici
represents that it authored this brief in its entirety and that
none of the parties or their counsel, nor any other person
or entity other than amici or their counsel, made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission
of this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.2(a), counsel for amici also
represents that all parties were provided notice of amici ’s
intention to file this brief at least 10 days before it was due and
that the parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
2 See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade in Goods
and Services (FT900), Exhibit 5 (Jan. 5, 2018), available at
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_
press_release/index.html.
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Near the middle of the last century, this Court held
that the Import-Export Clause prohibits a State from
levying a sales tax on goods that have begun a
“continuous route or journey” to a foreign destination.
See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
329 U.S. 69, 79 (1946).3 The Court borrowed this
“continuous route or journey” test—also known as
the “stream of export” test—from an earlier dormant
Commerce Clause decision that addressed the taxation of goods in interstate rather than international
trade. See Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527
(1886). The Richfield Oil test for exports was the
jurisprudential analogue to the “original package” test
for imports, which held that imported goods retained
immunity from state personal property taxes until
they left the importer’s control or were broken up
from their original cases. See Low v. Austin, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 29, 32-34 (1871).
In the years since Richfield Oil, this Court has
ceased to rely on Coe’s “continuous route or journey”
test for dormant Commerce Clause purposes. See
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
279 (1977). The Court also has discarded the “original package” doctrine as applied to imports. See
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-86
(1976). And the Court has cast doubt on Richfield
Oil ’s continued validity in two cases. See Department
of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 757 n.23 (1978);
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60,
3 While Richfield Oil involved a tax on gross receipts (sales),
lower courts have extended its holding to taxes that are based
on the value of personal property. See, e.g., Virginia Indonesia
Co. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 907-15
(Tex. 1995).
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77 (1993). Still, this Court has yet to overrule Richfield Oil explicitly.
Courts in eight States as well as one federal court
of appeals no longer adhere to Richfield Oil. Their
decision to depart from Richfield Oil follows logically
from this Court’s opinion in Michelin Tire, which
rejected the premises upon which Richfield Oil
rested. Courts in five other States as well as another
federal court of appeals have said that Richfield Oil
remains binding until this Court expressly overrules
it. This split generates uncertainty for market actors
as they struggle to develop long-term business plans,
and it interferes with the ability of state and local
governments to craft durable tax regimes.
Such uncertainty on its own is sufficient to justify
this Court’s intervention. And, if and when it steps
in, this Court should relegate Richfield Oil to the
dustbin. Richfield Oil ’s holding is at odds with the
text and purpose of the Import-Export Clause; it has
proven to be difficult for lower courts to apply; and it
encourages exporters to alter their business practices
in inefficient ways so as to ensure exemption for their
goods. The businesses that cannot or choose not to
put themselves through contortions in order to qualify
for exemption then bear a disproportionate tax burden.
Perhaps these consequences would be tolerable if
Richfield Oil vindicated important constitutional
values. But, to the contrary, Richfield Oil ’s holding
—that the Import-Export Clause prohibits the application of a nondiscriminatory tax to exports that
have begun a “continuous route or journey” out of the
country—needlessly infringes upon the fiscal autonomy of States without advancing the Import-Export
Clause’s core objectives.

4
In the end, all that Richfield Oil ’s holding has
going for it is stare decisis. But if stare decisis
was not enough to save Richfield Oil ’s dormant
Commerce Clause cousin or the analogous “original
package” rule for imports, it cannot carry the day
here. Reliance interests weigh on both sides, and the
Court has given fair warning to regulated parties
that it will reconsider Richfield Oil in the appropriate case. That case has now arrived, and this Court
should seize the opportunity to overrule Richfield Oil
once and for all.
ARGUMENT
I. RICHFIELD OIL IS A DOCTRINAL ANACHRONISM
Richfield Oil ’s essential holding—that state and
local governments cannot impose nondiscriminatory
sales taxes on goods that have begun a “continuous
route or journey” to a foreign destination—is based
on a dubious interpretation of the Constitution’s
Import-Export Clause. Cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10,
cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing it’s [sic] inspection Laws . . . .”).4 The
“continuous route or journey” test for exports is the
analogue to the “original package” rule for imports,
which this Court adopted in the nineteenth century
4 The Import-Export Clause is distinct from the Export
Clause, which applies to Congress rather than to the States.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid
on Articles exported from any State.”); United States v. IBM
Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 857 (1996) (“The Export Clause prohibits
Congress from laying any ‘Tax or Duty’ on exports, while the
Import-Export Clause prevents the States from laying any
‘Imposts or Duties’ on imports or exports.”).
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and ultimately discarded in the twentieth. Richfield
Oil ’s holding deserves the same fate.
The “original package” doctrine dates back to Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). Under
Brown, a good qualifies as an “import”—and so is
immune from an “impost” or “duty” levied by a
State—as long as the good “remain[s] the property of
the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form
or package in which it was imported.” Id. at 442.
Significantly, Brown did not hold that every tax on
imported goods in their original packages violated
the Import-Export Clause. Under Brown, a tax on
imported goods in their original packages ran afoul of
the constitutional prohibition only if the tax also
qualified as an “impost” or “duty.” See Michelin Tire,
423 U.S. at 295-98 (explaining Brown).
Four-and-a-half decades after Brown was decided,
this Court in Low v. Austin extended the “original
package” rule far beyond its original scope and held
that the Import-Export Clause barred States from
imposing any tax on imported goods while those
goods remained in their original packages. See Low,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 34. Under Low, even a personal
property tax that treated imported goods in their
original packages the same as other personal property
in the State would violate the Import-Export Clause.
See id. at 35. While the Low Court’s extension of
Brown was “uniformly” criticized as a misreading
of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, Michelin Tire,
423 U.S. at 282-83 (collecting sources), the Court
continued to apply Low’s “original package” rule to
strike down nondiscriminatory state and local taxes
into the middle of the twentieth century. See, e.g.,

6
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 654, 679
(1945) (“Hooven I ”).
The “continuous route or journey” test for exports
is of more recent vintage. The rule is sometimes
attributed to this Court’s 1886 decision in Coe v.
Town of Errol, which held that goods remained subject to state taxation “in the usual way” until they
had “been shipped, or entered with a common carrier
for transportation, to another state,” or had “been
started upon such transportation in a continuous
route or journey.” 116 U.S. at 527. See, e.g., Virginia
Indonesia, 910 S.W.2d at 908. Coe, however, concerned the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause’s
restrictions on state taxation of interstate trade,
not the Import-Export Clause’s restrictions on state
taxation of foreign trade. See Coe, 116 U.S. at 526.
It was not until after World War II, in Richfield Oil,
that this Court first invoked Coe’s “continuous route
or journey” language to strike down a nondiscriminatory state tax on the grounds that it operated as a
duty on exports in violation of the Import-Export
Clause. See Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 79, 86.
In the years since Richfield Oil, this Court has
departed from Coe’s “continuous route or journey”
test in its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Now, a state tax generally will survive a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge as long as the tax (1) “is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State,” (2) “is fairly apportioned,” (3) “does
not discriminate against interstate commerce,” and
(4) “is fairly related to the services provided by the
State.” Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. And, at
around the same time as it moved beyond Coe’s
“continuous route or journey” formulation for dormant
Commerce Clause purposes, the Court expressly
overruled its “original package” doctrine for Import-

7
Export Clause purposes. See Michelin Tire, 423 U.S.
at 301. Now, a tax that applies to imports will be
struck down on Import-Export Clause grounds only if
it (1) undermines the federal government’s ability to
“speak with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments,” (2) diverts import
revenue from the federal government to the States, or
(3) disturbs “harmony among the States” by allowing
“seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry,”
to use their position to the disadvantage of “other
States not situated as favorably geographically.” Id.
at 285-86; accord Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S.
at 753-55; Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 76.
Michelin Tire was a case about imports, while this
case is about exports. But the holding of Michelin
Tire did not hinge on what it means to be an “import”; it turned on what it means to be an “impost” or
“duty.” As the Court in Michelin Tire explained:
[T]he [Import-Export] Clause is not written in
terms of a broad prohibition of every “tax.” The
prohibition is only against States laying “Imposts
or Duties” . . . . By contrast, Congress is empowered to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts,
and Excises[,]” which plainly lends support to a
reading of the Import-Export Clause as not prohibiting every exaction or “tax” which falls in
some measure on imported goods. . . . The characteristic common to both “imposts” and “duties”
was that they were exactions directed at imports
or commercial activity as such and, as imposed
by the seaboard States under the Articles of
Confederation, were purposefully employed to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce and tax
States situated less favorably geographically.
423 U.S. at 290-93 (emphasis added).

8
Prior to Michelin Tire, cases such as Richfield Oil
“had assumed that all taxes on imports and exports
. . . were banned by the Clause.” Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 751-52 (recounting history). By
contrast, Michelin Tire “initiated a different approach
to Import-Export Clause cases” according to which
the Court focused instead on “analyz[ing] the nature
of the tax to determine whether it was an ‘Impost or
Duty.’ ” Id. at 752. Thus, even if goods obtain the
status of “exports” once they begin a “continuous
route or journey” to a foreign destination, the reasoning of Michelin Tire would suggest that such goods
still can be subject to nondiscriminatory state and
local taxes as long as those taxes are not imposts or
duties—that is, as long as they are not directed at
imports or exports as such.
But, while the logical implication of Michelin Tire
is that a nondiscriminatory state tax that applies
to exports is not a constitutionally prohibited impost
or duty, this Court has never explicitly overruled
Richfield Oil ’s holding that a nondiscriminatory tax
runs afoul of the Import-Export Clause if it applies
to goods that have begun a “continuous route or
journey” out of the country. Justice Powell pressed
the Court to take that step shortly after Michelin
Tire, but a majority of the Justices chose “to defer
decision until a case with pertinent facts is presented.” Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 757 n.23;
see id. at 761-64 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result). More recently, the State
of Tennessee urged this Court to recognize that
Richfield Oil had been “abandoned,” Br. of Resp. 4142, Itel Containers, No. 91-321 (U.S. filed June 25,
1992), 1992 WL 511845, but again the Court concluded
that the question was not squarely before it. See Itel
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Containers, 507 U.S. at 77 (“Even assuming that [the
Richfield Oil ] rule has not been altered by the
approach we adopted in Michelin, it is inapplicable
here.”).
All of this puts Richfield Oil in precedential purgatory. The idea that every tax on exports is an impost
or duty—the idea underlying Richfield Oil ’s holding
—makes the word “tax” in other clauses of the
Constitution mere surplusage. See U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”); art. I,
§ 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State.”).5 And the notion that
a nondiscriminatory tax on exports is an impost or
duty within the meaning of the Import-Export Clause
stands in irreconcilable tension with this Court’s conclusion in Michelin Tire that a tax is not an impost or
duty unless it implicates the Import-Export Clause’s
core objectives. Whether one focuses on the ImportExport Clause’s text or its purpose, Richfield Oil has
little to recommend itself. It remains on the books
only because the Court has not yet heard a case in
which its status was directly at stake. The petition
here presents such a case.

5 Thus, overruling Richfield Oil ’s restriction on nondiscriminatory state and local taxes would be entirely consistent with
this Court’s holding in IBM, which prohibits Congress from
imposing a federal tax on exports. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 857
(“In both Michelin and Washington Stevedoring, we left open
the possibility that a particular state assessment might not
properly be called an impost or duty, and thus would be beyond
the reach of the Import-Export Clause, while an identical federal
assessment might properly be called a tax and would be subject
to the Export Clause.”).

10
II. FAILURE TO ADDRESS RICHFIELD OIL’S
STATUS CREATES UNCERTAINTY FOR
MARKET ACTORS AND FOR STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
This Court’s failure to address Richfield Oil ’s
ongoing validity puts lower courts in a bind. On the
one hand, the Court has instructed lower courts to
take heed of Michelin Tire’s obvious implications.
See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353,
359, 361 (1984) (“Hooven II ”) (“While we acknowledge that Hooven I was not expressly overruled in
Michelin, the latter case strongly implies that the
foundation of the former had been seriously undermined. . . . The conclusion of the Supreme Court of
Ohio that Hooven I retains current validity in this
respect is therefore in error.”). On the other hand,
this Court has said that, if one of its precedents “has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the
[lower court] should follow the case which directly
controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989). Caught between the force of Michelin Tire
and the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas, lower courts
have gone in both directions.
The Eleventh Circuit and the courts of at least
eight States—including three state supreme courts—
appear to have concluded that Michelin Tire supplants Richfield Oil.6 The Fifth Circuit and the
6 See Auto Cargo, Inc. v. Miami Dade Cnty., 237 F.3d 1289,
1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (Michelin Tire overruled the stream-ofexport doctrine); State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp Am.,
Inc., 674 P.2d 268, 279 (Alaska 1983) (Michelin Tire test applies
to gross receipts tax on exported goods); Itel Containers Int’l
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courts of at least five States—including three state
supreme courts—have recognized Richfield Oil as
good law.7
Courts of appeals in one State—
Corp. v. Cardwell, 814 S.W.2d 29, 37-38 (Tenn. 1991) (applying
Michelin Tire rather than Richfield Oil ), aff ’d on other grounds
sub nom. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60
(1993); U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton, 631 S.E.2d 559, 562-64
(W. Va. 2005) (same); P.J. Lumber Co. v. City of Prichard, No.
2160627, 2017 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 185, at *7 (Civ. App. Sept.
22, 2017) (Richfield Oil is “no longer valid”); Arizona Dep’t of
Revenue v. Robinson’s Hardware, 721 P.2d 137, 139 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (“[T]he rule enunciated in Richfield is no longer
the proper standard by which to measure the validity of state
taxation on foreign commerce under the Import-Export Clause.”);
Bradford Exch. A.G. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 508 N.E.2d
316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (applying Michelin Tire and noting
that “[t]he taxpayer’s reliance on Richfield Oil . . . ignores the
central holding of Michelin that the absolute ban is only of
‘Imposts or Duties’ and not of all taxes”); Holt Hauling & Warehousing Sys., Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 9 N.J. Tax 446,
449-52 (1987) (applying Michelin Tire rather than Richfield
Oil ); David Hazan, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 543 N.Y.S.2d
545 (App. Div. 1989), aff ’d without opinion, 556 N.E.2d 1113
(N.Y. 1990); see also David Hazan, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 547 (Mikoll,
J., dissenting) (noting that Tax Tribunal decision affirmed by
Appellate Division had concluded that Michelin Tire and Washington Stevedoring “abrogated the concept of ‘export stream’ ”).
7 See Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Pilot Petroleum
Corp., 900 F.2d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Richfield Oil );
Virginia Indonesia, 910 S.W.2d at 912-14 (following Louisiana
Land and Richfield Oil ); Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of
Loudoun, 803 S.E.2d 54, 60 (Va. 2017) (decision below) (“[t]he
bright line Richfield Oil test, rather than the policy based
Michelin test, supplies the rule of decision”); Coast Pac. Trading,
Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 719 P.2d 541, 544 (Wash. 1986)
(“Michelin and Stevedoring have not overruled decisions that
struck down taxes levied directly on goods that had reached the
export stream. These decisions include Richfield Oil . . . .”);
Ammex, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 603 N.W.2d 308, 313
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]e must conclude that Richfield Oil
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California—appear to be split on the question. Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1413, 1421 n.4, 1424 (1992)
(applying Richfield Oil and noting that the ImportExport Clause’s exemption “still applies to goods in
the export stream”), with City of Los Angeles v.
Marine Wholesale/Warehouse Co., 15 Cal. App. 4th
1834, 1838, 1843-46 (1993) (upholding gross receipts
tax on warehouse “engaged solely in sales of goods
. . . to cruise ships and airlines that were engaged
solely in sailing to foreign ports and flying to foreign
locations”). Cf. National Film Labs. v. California
State Bd. of Equalization, No. D049006, 2007 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 8088, at *23-24 (Oct. 4, 2007)
(noting apparent split). The split divides the States
that rank highest in terms of total merchandise
exports, with Texas and Washington (number one
and number three) on the opposite side of New York
and Illinois (number four and number five), and the
second largest exporter—California—itself conflicted.8
Uncertainty over Richfield Oil ’s status has negative effects on market actors as well as state and
local governments. Businesses engaged in the export
of goods enter into long-term contracts without being
able to anticipate their tax liabilities. State and local
governments design their own tax systems without
knowing whether elements will be struck down on
has precedential value.”); Lipshutz Bros., Inc. v. Tax Review Bd.,
4 Phila. 374, 386, 1980 WL 194215 (C.P. Pa. 1980) (stream-ofexport doctrine “remains fully effective”), aff ’d, 439 A.2d 862
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
8 For figures on total merchandise exports by State, see U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce, Int’l Trade Admin., 2016 NAICS Total All
Merchandise Exports to World, available at http://tse.export.gov/
tse/MapDisplay.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
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Import-Export Clause grounds. For that reason,
litigants on both sides of the issue have asked the
Court to clarify whether Richfield Oil remains valid.
Compare Pet. for Cert., Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist.
v. Virginia Indonesia Co., No. 95-1528 (U.S. filed
Mar. 20, 1996), 1996 WL 33439089 (asking Court to
overrule Richfield Oil ), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1004
(1996), with Pet. for Cert., U.S. Steel Mining Co. v.
Helton, No. 05-1268 (U.S. filed Mar. 31, 2006), 2006
WL 869888 (asking Court to reaffirm Richfield Oil ),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1179 (2006). The status quo is
one in which no one wins.
III. RICHFIELD OIL SHOULD BE OVERRULED
By granting this petition and resolving the split
over Richfield Oil ’s status, this Court can reduce
uncertainty for all involved—whichever way it comes
down on the merits. That said, overruling Richfield
Oil is clearly the better course. Richfield Oil ’s
“continuous route or journey” test has proven difficult
to apply in practice, and, when applied, it produces
inefficient and inequitable results. Moreover, the
Richfield Oil doctrine has led to unnecessary infringement upon state and local fiscal autonomy. And,
because there are strong reliance interests on both
sides, stare decisis does not provide a persuasive
reason to retain Richfield Oil.
A. Richfield Oil Does Not Supply Lower
Courts with an Administrable Test
The Richfield Oil test has proven to be devilishly
difficult for lower courts to administer. This is
especially ironic given that the only justification this
Court has ever offered for the Richfield Oil rule is its
clarity. As the Court observed in Kosydar v. National
Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974):
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It may be said that insistence upon an actual
movement into the stream of export in the case
at hand represents an overly wooden or mechanistic application of the Coe doctrine. This is
an instance, however, where we believe that
simplicity has its virtues. . . . [E]ven if it is not an
easy matter to set down a rule determining the
moment in time when articles obtain the protection of the Import-Export Clause, it is highly
important, both to the shipper and to the State,
that it should be clearly defined so as to avoid all
ambiguity or question.
But, rather than “avoid[ing] all ambiguity,”
Richfield Oil ’s “continuous route or journey” test has
created decades of headaches for litigants and lower
courts. The test is easy enough to apply when a
U.S. manufacturer sends goods to a customer abroad
via common carrier, but distribution channels for
exporters are rarely so straightforward. Consider the
following scenarios, all drawn from litigated ImportExport Clause cases:
 A hardware store in the border city of Nogales,
Arizona, sells merchandise to Mexican factories.
The merchandise is delivered to warehouses
maintained by Mexican manufacturers on the
U.S. side of the border. At the time the goods
are sold by the hardware store, have they begun
their “continuous route or journey” to their
foreign destination, such that the State of
Arizona would be barred from imposing a tax
on the store’s sales? See Robinson’s Hardware,
721 P.2d at 137-38.
 A manufacturer in Long Beach, California, sells
aircraft parts to a Mexican airline. A U.S. common carrier transports the parts via truck to the
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U.S.-Mexico border, where they remain for 48
hours to complete customs processing. The parts
are then loaded onto the trucks of a Mexican
common carrier and delivered to Mexico City.
Do the aircraft parts begin their “continuous
route or journey” to a foreign destination when
they are delivered to the U.S. trucker, or does
the 48-hour pause and the transfer from one
common carrier to another break up the trip?
See McDonnell Douglas, 10 Cal. App. 4th at
1416-17.
 A U.S. corporation, acting as agent for an
Indonesian joint venture, buys oil and gas exploration equipment from various vendors across
the United States. The equipment is delivered
to an independent export packer in Houston,
Texas, where it is inspected prior to export to
Indonesia. Some damaged or defective goods
may remain with the packer for up to six
months. At the time the goods arrive at the
export packer, have they already begun a
“continuous route or journey” to their ultimate
Indonesian destination? See Virginia Indonesia,
910 S.W.2d at 906-07, 912-15 (holding that goods
are immune from personal property tax). But
see Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 337 U.S.
286, 288-89 (1949) (15-month delay interrupts
continuity of export process).
These fact patterns illustrate the array of difficult
line-drawing questions with which courts applying
Richfield Oil must wrestle. To be sure, any legal
doctrine requires line-drawing, but the line-drawing
challenge here is particularly acute. Typically, this
Court either (a) issues a “rule” that tells lower courts
precisely how to respond to specific triggering facts,
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or (b) lays out a “standard” that directs lower courts
to apply background principles and policies on a
case-by-case basis. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58-59
(1992). The problem with Richfield Oil is that it is
neither a bright-line rule nor a standard based on
principles and policies. Unlike a successful brightline rule, Richfield Oil leaves lower courts to confront
countless cases of ambiguity. And, unlike a successful standard, Richfield Oil identifies no background
principle or policy to which a lower court can appeal
in an ambiguous case.
The Richfield Oil test thus fails doubly in its attempt to “avoid all ambiguity” regarding the ImportExport Clause’s scope. Cf. Kosydar, 417 U.S. at 71.
First, it has not brought clarity to the tax treatment
of exports because States and market actors are not
sure whether Richfield Oil even applies. And, second,
even if the Court does reaffirm Richfield Oil, lower
courts will be left with little guidance as to how
to apply Richfield Oil ’s holding in the multitude of
cases that will fall close to the line. A general rule
that nondiscriminatory sales and personal property
taxes are not “imposts” or “duties” for purposes of the
Import-Export Clause would avoid the administrative and compliance challenges that Richfield Oil has
engendered.
B. Richfield Oil Is Inefficient, Inequitable,
and Unnecessarily Intrusive upon State
Fiscal Autonomy
Aside from administrability concerns, Richfield Oil
fails to allocate tax burdens in an efficient and equitable manner. It motivates market actors to distort
their behavior in order to claim exemption. It shifts

17
tax burdens from some businesses to others in entirely
arbitrary ways. And it gratuitously intrudes upon
the fiscal autonomy of state and local governments.
As for efficiency: Wherever lower courts applying
Richfield Oil ultimately draw the line between exports
and non-exports, market actors will be encouraged to
alter their operations so that their sales fall on the
export side of the line. For example, if a court holds
that delivery to a common carrier for transport to
Mexico marks the start of a “continuous route or
journey” abroad but that delivery to the Mexican
manufacturer’s U.S. warehouse does not, exporters
will have an incentive to deliver to the common
carrier even if delivery to the warehouse would be
more efficient from a non-tax perspective. Indeed,
the facts of the present case illustrate the extent
to which businesses may distort their distribution
channels in order to secure exemption. Instead of
delivering a handbag or watch to the purchaser at
the point of sale, respondent gives the purchaser a
ticket, and a “duty free runner” then “delivers the
item to the buyer at the jetway immediately prior to
boarding and the customer hands the ticket to the
runner.” Dulles Duty Free, 803 S.E.2d at 55 (decision
below). Such contortions may be necessitated by
Richfield Oil ’s “continuous route or journey” test, but,
if so, that is one strike against retaining Richfield
Oil.
As for equity: Richfield Oil allows some businesses
to escape the application of sales and personal
property taxes, and, by doing so, shifts more of the
tax burden to other businesses and individuals. See
Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 87 (Black, J., dissenting)
(foreseeing that Richfield Oil will “creat[e] an island
of constitutional tax immunity for a substantial pro-
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portion of the profitable business of the nation” and
thus “throw[ ] an unfair part of the tax burden on
others”). This burden-shifting has little relationship
to the benefits that various businesses derive from
state and local government services. Businesses that
export goods to foreign countries rely on local police
and fire departments, roads, garbage clean-up, and
other state and municipal services no less than
counterparts that manufacture goods for in-state use
or that ship their goods domestically rather than
internationally. There is no apparent reason why
exporters should pay any less for those services than
other taxpayers in the same jurisdiction. See id. at
89 (“[T]he history and the evolution of the constitutional prohibition against taxation of exports manifest
that there was no intention to subsidize either export
businesses or foreign purchasers by any such broad
immunity from state and federal taxation.”).
All the while, Richfield Oil needlessly constrains
the fiscal autonomy of state and local governments.
Of course, the Import-Export Clause contemplates
such intrusions when necessary to vindicate the
clause’s core objectives: (1) to allow the federal government to “speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations” with foreign nations; (2) to
ensure that “import revenues,” which were once the
federal government’s “major source of revenue,” are
not “diverted to the States”; and (3) to preserve
“harmony among the States” by preventing “seaboard
States, with their crucial ports of entry,” from
extracting rents from “other States not situated as
favorably geographically.” Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at
285-86. But Richfield Oil addresses none of these
concerns.
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Applying a nondiscriminatory state or local tax to
goods in the stream of export does not interfere with
the federal government’s conduct of international
economic affairs. When foreign governments object
to U.S. state and local tax treatment of exports, they
generally object on the grounds that exports are
treated too favorably. See, e.g., World Trade Org.,
Report of the Appellate Body:
United States—
Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS487/AB/R (Sept. 4, 2017) (European Union
challenge to Washington State tax incentives for
aircraft industry), available at https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/487abr_e.pdf.
It is the
exemption of exports—not the nondiscriminatory
taxation of exports—that creates foreign policy
complications. Moreover, state and local taxation
of goods in the stream of export does not interfere
with federal revenue-raising. The federal government
historically has relied on import revenue but never
on export revenue—and, indeed, the federal government is itself prohibited from taxing exports. See
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. Finally, a nondiscriminatory state or local tax based on the value of personal
property or sales does not raise the risk of “interstate
rivalry and friction.” Washington Stevedoring, 435
U.S. at 754. As this Court has said, “[t]he third
Import-Export Clause policy . . . is vindicated if the
tax falls upon a taxpayer with reasonable nexus to
the State, is properly apportioned, does not discriminate, and relates reasonably to services provided by
the State.” Id. at 754-55.
C. Reliance Interests Do Not Weigh in Favor
of Retaining Richfield Oil
Overruling a precedent—even a poorly reasoned
precedent that produces inconsistent, inefficient, and
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inequitable results—is never a small matter.
“[R]eliance on a judicial opinion is a significant
reason to adhere to it.” Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007).
Here, however, reliance interests cannot justify
Richfield Oil ’s retention—for three reasons.
First, reliance interests weigh on both sides in
this case. Concededly, some businesses may have
made long-term investments on the assumption that
Richfield Oil ensured exemption from certain state
and local taxes. At the same time, lawmakers and
tax authorities in jurisdictions whose courts no
longer follow Richfield Oil have constructed their
own tax systems on the assumption that this Court
would carry Michelin Tire through to its logical conclusion. Cf. Hooven II, 466 U.S. at 359, 361 (“error”
for state court to continue to rely on a precedent that
was “seriously undermined”—but “not expressly
overruled”—by Michelin Tire). So, too, businesses
in those jurisdictions that have not designed their
distribution channels in order to claim exemption
under Richfield Oil will be placed at a disadvantage
if new competitors can swoop in and secure immunity
from state and local taxes. The revival of Richfield
Oil in the twenty-first century would upset reliance
interests at least as much as a decision to lay
Richfield Oil to rest.
Second, this Court has given fair warning to all
who would listen that Richfield Oil stands on its last
legs. As far back as 1978, the Court indicated that it
would reconsider Richfield Oil when “a case with
pertinent facts is presented.” Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 757 n.23. And, again in 1993, the
Court issued a reminder that Richfield Oil ’s validity
was in doubt. See Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 77
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(“Even assuming that [the Richfield Oil ] rule has not
been altered by the approach we adopted in Michelin
. . . .”) (emphasis added). Any business that made a
long-term investment in the past several decades on
the assumption that Richfield Oil would survive
must have known that it was engaged in a gamble.
If the Court grants this petition and overrules
Richfield Oil, no one can claim that she or he was
blindsided.
Third, this Court did not consider the reliance
argument to be a sufficient justification for retaining
the “original package” doctrine for imports. See
Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 282-83. Nor did this Court
think that reliance interests weighed decisively
in favor of adhering to the formalistic dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine from which Richfield
Oil borrowed. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
Reliance interests here are no stronger—indeed,
much weaker—than in Michelin Tire or Complete
Auto. Both of those decisions marked significant
deviations from prior precedent. See Washington
Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 752 (“Michelin initiated a
different approach to Import-Export Clause cases.”);
U.S. Steel Mining, 631 S.E.2d at 562 (“the focus of
Import-Export Clause analysis took a sharp turn
in Michelin Tire”); IBM, 517 U.S. at 851 (noting
“[o]ur rejection in Complete Auto of much of our
early dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence”). By
contrast, overruling Richfield Oil would amount to
follow-through on an intention telegraphed well in
advance. Reliance interests thus supply no reason
for this Court to retain a doctrine that distorts
economic decisionmaking, allocates tax burdens
unfairly, and undermines the fiscal autonomy of
state and local governments.
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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